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INTRODUCTION 
Joel M 1I0lperll 
University of Massachusetts/A mherst 
\\ar in \'Uj:.osl:Hia alld Il~ PlIraUels 
Th l ~ Is~ue presents American and West 
European anthropologICal perspectives on recenl events 
prior ICl Ihe outbreak of war m former Yugoslavia 
Included are anicle~ hy anthropologiSts from Croatia 
and Serbia which deal directly With the war and its 
Impacl on their re~pective ~ocieties. The first group of 
essays ~hould be understood as background 10 armed 
struggle mvohmg \'iolcnl death , destruction. and 
bereavement and 10 those tragcdles still in the making. 
The horrors as«tCiale..! with events LII this Balkan 
selting are unparalleled in EurolM! since World War 
Two. They do not have precise parallels elsewhere but 
hring to mind tht: suffenngs of former communist 
states. As In late·i970s CamlxxlLa and. today III the 
Caucasus and Central ASia. Ili.Sues of conflicting 
nallonal Kienlllles have been paramount, ReligIOUS and 
nauunal conflic\l> also have parallels in non<ommunist 
area~. E\'cnlS m Cyprus and Lebanon. In Liberia. 
Angola, Somaha Jnd the Southern Sudan. as well as in 
Sri Lanka and Kashmir, are some eumples. 
In sum, the conflicts In ex.Yugoslavia are 
part of a late 20th century world-wKie trend. These 
mSlance~. although far from similar, involve military 
coniliLls over control nf teTTltories inhabited by 
conflicting nalional group:>. Such confl icts mflict severe 
privation on civilian populations assumed to be pan of 
the arena of conflict. In some cases crealion of a nalion 
state i~ the pr01t1mate cauo;e; in others. as in e~­
Yugoslavia, cnnflicts occur within and between 
recognized national entilles. ThiS serie( of essays. 
while having important analogues to cvents elsewhere. 
IS nOI primarily intended 10 be comparative but focuses 
on the Balkan case. 
Ralionalit} and Controlling Violence· A Possible 
Relalionship? 
A~ the multiple consequences of this conflict 
malte appareru, there IS a drastIC need to understand 
both Ihe ongms and manner of the violence. Our hope 
here. perhaps not totally In vain. is that some 
Ielatlonshlp exiSts belween understandmg and conflict 
rcwtullull h i~ from Ihls IM!rhaps naive perspective that 
I hcgln. Alter vislImg pans of ex·Yugoslavia this year 
11993) II M:cms absolutely essenllal to try in some 
ratnmal way to come to terms With tales of beheading. 
crucifi).k)n\. IInpallng. 'drawmg and quanering of 
men.· CVIM:eraIiOn of women. ralM! , castration. 
punilive circumcision, and the carving of crosses on 
flesh, Some of these are well-documented occurances; 
others await invesllgatlon. 
Associated with this mayhem is the 
widespread destruction of cultural propeny involving 
the dynamnmg of mO!:ques and churches and the 
obliteration of historic monuments. There has also been 
tremendous destruction of mfrastructure-hospitais, 
hOUSing stock. schools, water systems and bridges. 
The development of a forensic social-cultural 
anthropology can aid III the analysis of the atrocities. 
For example. there appear to be nalional styles of 
mfllcting dcath and mutilatmg corpses which seem to 
have historic precedents from both world wars and are 
found In sources such as Balkan epic poetry. 
OiSllnctions need, of course, to be made between 
civilian and military casualties. 
There IS also a need for an ethno-archaeology 
of llfchltectural deslruclKln. Signi6cant here are 
differences of structures destroyed by shelling or 
buildmgs deliberately blown up from within. Other 
distinctions include lootmg before destruction or 
mcmeral10n With contents III place. These acts of hatred 
all reqUired delibelllte planmng and lime to implement. 
and mamfest strongly held cultural values. 
Historic Roots or Ethnocentrism in Multinalionai 
Polities 
Such biases have deep roots. In the old 
entrance hall to a villa for visiting academics in the city 
of Graz there is a slogan emblazoned in German 
Gothic script: "German House, German Land, Prolect 
It God With a Strong Hand.· While these senliments 
were lurn-of-the-century pro-German Austrian 
nationalist. they also somewhat echo the eUlOocentrism 
of some Serb. Croat. and Moslem forces. Apparently 
now gone are !he accommodations which made possible 
the functIOning of the multInational AuStro-Hungarian 
empire. The end of World War One saw the demise of 
land·based, multinational empires of the curs. 
Ottomans, and Habsburgs. Yugoslavia was born to the 
Wilsonian illusion nf stales based on national identilies. 
As it combined AU!itro-Hungarian and Ottoman Turkish 
state traditions, hi~torical contradtetion was built in 
from lIS begmnm&. This state was fragmented during 
World War Two under German and AJl:is occupalion 
but was reconstituted with communist victory. It 
definitively collapsed with the demise of European 
communism. Still. liS the Czech and Slovak cases 
IlIuStrlle . cthnic fragmentation can be non-violent. 
Vol II, Nos. 1-2 Pille: 6 
Anthropology of East Europe Review--Special Issue 
Refugees as "Dirt" and "Livestock" 
PolltLcat fragmentatIOn has severe human 
consequences. War refugees have become throwaway. 
non·persons. Like Mary Douglas VI~\IIS dirt 
symbolically as 'maner out of piace.· Bosnians 
refugees are people who havt: become leu human in 
the eyes of those who now support them and among 
whom they now exist. Not qUlle inanimate dirt 
perhaps. but as one refugee in Austria expressed it. 
"We are something lik~ livestock which arc 
maintamed . • 
Bosnian Moslem I>t!ggars on the streets of 
medieval Graz represent more than the destruction and 
pauperizalion of a people. They represent a crucial 
failure tor the West. The full consequences of this a re 
not yet fully imagined. Reference here is not to moral 
law or religious values nor to contlicts with the Islamic 
world. Rather it is to the increasing interdependence of 
civilizations as we approach the 21st century. {fthe 
breakdown of civilized behavior is pennined without 
effective opposition. then we are all threatened. 
Civil Violence All A Basis of New State Structures 
Such comments cannot be made by an 
American as if we live in a society without large·scale 
violence. One need only mention the Los Angeles riots. 
But these riots represent individual, societal and state 
deficiencies. They lack. organization and do nOl 
question the legitimacy of the state. They indicate that 
multicultural U.S. continues 10 suffe r violence on the 
part of people who feel excluded from the system. 
Characteristically. redistribution by looting was the 
major act of out~f-contro l crowds and. like similar 
riots LD the U.S. stayed mainly in the ghetto. But in 
ex-Yugoslavia violence IS sponsored by organized 
groups In the context of one small state 's collapse and 
the emergence of successor mini states. Pre-1991 
Yugoslavia had a modest standard of living by 
American or Western European standards. Though 
some were poor tt:ere was (excepting Gypsies) no large 
raCIal or ethnic underclass as in the U.S. The outbreak 
of connict in Yugoslavia was unrelated 10 poverty. a 
sense of relative deprivation. or feelings of social 
exclusion. It was not the work of an urban proletariat. 
Most of these essays speak of societies at 
peace with a degree of relative prosperity . Many 
person. now refugees. felt they had a future. How 
then did existing ethnic distinctions and muted conflicts 
suddenly grow into the war on Croatian territory and 
the subsequent progress ive destruction of Bo~nian 
society? It is not historically valid to assign to the 
SerbIan people as a whole exclusive responsibility for 
the current silUalion. The outcome has been part of a 
spi ra! of hate and destruction involving all groups. 
These essays explore such matters from a variety of 
naltonal perspectives and cha llenge the reader hy their 
diversity . 
It is vital to keep in mind that me vIOlence 
was tOitiated by Serbs to Croalla from mose areas 
where their population was concentrdted (t:.g . KraJlna). 
However, they feel their action justified by hlSWrK:al 
fears deriving partly from theIr experience to Worlu 
War Two under the Croatian fascist state. As essays by 
Oenich, Hammel, Hayden and Simic point out, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia brought these SerbIan 
fears 10 the fore as a new Croatia emerged. replacing 
the secular republic of socialist Yugoslavia. 
Crimes and the Anthropology of War 
No maner where ultimate responsibility lies, 
the destructive consequences of the war are abundantly 
visible in both Croatia and Bosnia. In Siavonia 
traveling through villages and towns of a fonne r 
baulefield zone I gained some idea of the destruction 
apart from that on TV or in me press. I did not seek 
nor see any evidence to document the purported crimes 
referred to earl ier. But even withoutlhis evKlence. now 
being developed by private, UN, and member 
government commissions. there is a reality to these 
tales not only for those who are refugees but also for 
those who live in or neat destroyed areas. In such 
places there are visual reminders which keep alive 
these recent histories within traumatized communities. 
In refugee communities enforced idleness encourages a 
concentration of memory . 
The specifics of the different circumstances of 
these events provides the possibility of verifICation in 
ways familiar to both criminal investigation and 
anthropologicallield research . Already "anmropology 
of war" studies on ex-Yugoslavia have begun to 
appear. as the recent publication of the Instirute of 
Ethnology and Folklore in Zagreb to which 
Povrzanovit in this issue refers. These concerns will 
also be the focus of a conference planned for late 1993 
by the Institute of Ethnic Studies and the Slovene 
Anthropological Society in Ljubljana. 
Serbian self-perception and aggression 
In mentioning war crimes against persons and 
property my intention is not to demonize the Serbs as 
in the popular press. Still. I feel that Serbian military 
forces, both regulars and irregulars. operating in 
Croatia and in Bosnia. as well as the remaining 
"Yugoslav Anny" of present truncated Yugoslavia. do 
share a pnffiary. although flOt exclusive, responsibility 
for the current conflict. These complex distinctions a rc 
pointed out in U.S. and U.N. reports as well as mose 
of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Hels inki Walch. 
Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia have also 
suffered grievously from the war and many (including 
some Moslems) are now refugees in Serbia. There is. 
however, another view of Serbian aggression which 
focuses on motivations and which has been discussed in 
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the press , This concerns theIr vicw of themselves as 
victim even as they initiate aggression For example. m 
Time Magazine of April 12. 1993 an essay entitled" A 
Moral Mystery: Serbian Self.Plty" aniculated this 
view: 
I had wondered for months how in the face of 
the world's almost unanimous condemnauon 
and disgust (exceptmg Onhodox countries 
like Greece and Russia. Jmh) the Serbs could 
keep up a war conducted by rape. murder ami 
the starvauon of whole cities. How do the 
Serbs keep on? How do they explalO 
themselves? ... .1n theIr own minds they have 
solved their fonmdable moral problem by 
declanng themselves the injured parI)' ... The 
Belgrade television sllItions endlessly show 
atrOCLly scenes, dramas displaying Serbs as 
victims. with grinning Muslim devils holding 
the severed heads of Serbs. The trul) 
accomplished ethnic selr-pitier projects all 
around him as :I siege of malevolent 
conspIracy. 
Such views emphasize the deep historical roots 
stretchmg back 10 the defeat of Serbian imperial forces 
by the Ottoman Turks al the Bailie of Kosovo in 1389. 
The anniversary of this defeat was a Serbian national 
holiday in pre-World War Two Yugoslavia. The 
complex of attitudes associated WIth Serbian 
martyrdom and glorified in their epic poetry makes it 
easier for foreign journalists to see the Serbs as the 
core of evil. 
Reciprocal Demonization 
Not surprisingly the panies to the conniet 
reclpl"OC.llly demomze each other. Thus many Croats 
and Serbs see each other 10 World War Two time 
frames. The Serbs picture Croats as fascist Ustashi 
while Croats depict Serbs as Chetniks (i.e. Serb 
royalists in World War Two), supporters of a prewar 
regime that suppressed their rightful Identity. Since he 
Serbs view Moslems as fundamentalist radicals, they 
consider themselves defenders of Western Civilization 
from a Moslem onslaught. Moslems see themselves as 
victims of Christian persecution. reversing the image of 
"the terrible Turk" persecuting Balkan Christians. 
The IIlne warp is funher emphasized by both 
Serb and Croat forces which have adopted unifonns 
and msignia used m World War Two. Worn as badges 
of pride of Identuy by one side, they symbolize death 
and destruction for the other. Thelf respective media 
remforce these views. These faclors are cited hy 
several of the authors in their contrlhut ions. 
Anthropological concepts of Ilminalily are clearly 
applicable here. 
A Visit to Lipik in Croatia and the Ethnograph) or 
f)estruction 
A "1511 10 the former spa of Liplk en3bled me 
to pul a personal perspective on Map Povrzano\i(;'~ 
text thiS lown IS located on the Croauan-SerblJn truce 
hne 10 Siavoma, to the east of Zagreb. Ilear the town 
of Kutina and the now aimosi-deserted hIghway that 
connected Zagreb and Belgrade. The conditional nature 
of Croatia's sovereignty I~ emphaSIzed hy the 
omnipresence of UN forces. To reach Liplk II was 
necessary to pass through two UN checkpoints. The 
town formerly had a mixed Serb-Croat populallon. 
Some of the former Serbian IIIhabltanl.S are named as 
war refugees m documents published in Belgrade We 
\I,oere told that the local Scrbs had ned wllh the 
retreatlOg Serb forces. 
One woman to ld of her parent~, then in their 
eighties, who stayed hehlOd when the town was 
evacu,lIed by Croatian forces durmg Ihe 1991 fightlOg . 
She described how upon her return she found diem 
wilh their throats sill. They had lived next door and 
she showed us their kllchen where their aprons still 
hung neatly on hooks. In a way. she expected them to 
emerge from meir kllchen as they always had 
While there were destroyed houses all around. 
there was also evidence of rebuilding (with private 
German aid). A private cafe had opened next to Ihe 
demolished depanment store; Ihe firm had the Ironic 
name of Budutnosl (Future). The spa was the 
prinCIple industry of the town . It had existed since the 
end of the 19th century and was recently remodeled. A 
large glassed-in area had contained a swinlllllng pool 
and special nllneral balhs. 
The destruction here was lotal With shattered 
,lass constantly underfoot. The demohtion seemed 
purposeful and obviously had IlIken lime to complete. 
We were shown graffiti in a nearby cellar. It was 10 
Serbian Cyrillic SCript with comments about damning 
and i::illing Croats. This kind of evidence clearly needs 
careful evaluation and, of course. can be falsified. 
Still. the enonmty of the totally shattered spa spread 
over several acres was very real. as ..... ere the burned 
OUI tnteriors of homes. 
Impact of the War on Serbia 
In Serbia the Impact of the war has been ~c"ere but 
lOdlrect. A sigmficant pan of my Sludies 10 Yugoslavia 
was concerned with the Serhlan Village of OroiSlIC, 
south of Belgl1lde near the town of Topoili. the home 
of the Serbian (Karadjordjevic) dynasty. While recentl) 
m Austria. I met wllh ..... orkers from OUQC whll now 
live permanently in ..... estern Europe LIke many other 
communities in Serbia. Ora;\tc now h3~ rcfu~ee~ from 
Bosnia. Hotels in the nearby lourisl town of 
ArandJClovac are also full of refu~ccs. man)' Imm 
Bosnia. 
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One of these workers recoumcd how a young 
Ora~c neighhor. who had fought in Bosnia and at 
Vukovar (the ethnically mixed Croatian Slavoman town 
destroyed by the ·Yugoslav · army). had "gone partly 
mad." lie ran around the village half naked in the 
middle of wimer "shouting aimlessly." Tn his more 
rational moments he described how. on hurial 
assignment. he saw the sexually mutilated corpses of 
Serbian soldiers. One my informants deSCribed Serbia 
as anarchic. He recounted how at a hotel he had an 
encounter with a Bosnian Serb who threatened him. He 
notic.:d the registration of the man's car. It still had the 
Croatian owner's name prominently displayed. 
These villagers sought to differentiate 
themselves as Sumadijans from the "heart of Serbia" as 
opposed to Bosnian Serbs and those from Krajina. 
They felt they had a different outlooks and values from 
those outside Serbia proper. A key distinction is that 
Sumadijan Serbs have always lived In an ethnic .. lIy 
homogeneous area. a situation the Serbs HI Krajina and 
Bosnia have been trying to create. One impact is 
clear: the near destruction of the economy now 
suffering sanction-related hyper-inflation . As of 
September 1993 the central bank issued ItS first billion 
dinar note with a value of approximately $3.50. The 
rate of inflation is reckoned to increase hourly. 
Demonstrations in Serbia and Conflict in Croatia 
Mirjana Pro~i(:-Dvornic's essay in this 
volume discusses students and activist women's groups 
in Belgrade who have organized anti-war 
demonstrations. These vigorous and innovative events 
have so far had minimal effects on government policy. 
They have, however. made military recruitment more 
difficult and certainly added to the government's 
growing problems. tn her contribution ProsK: Dvornit 
documents concerted effons by an Important pan of 
Serbian society to differentiate themselves frum the 
spurious folk ethos espoused by Milo~evi(: and his 
supponers. Their lack of political power rcfkclS that 
urban intellectuals and their supponers have not 
succeeded in enlisting other groups. But her details of 
the protests presents a facet of contemporary Serbian 
society which has received almost no anention in the 
foreign press. 
In a view from Zagreb, Povrzanoee discusses 
the impact of the war on Croatia. A conflict which. at 
the time of the writing , had left some 3,CXlO dead. 
8.000 missing. and 700.000 homeless. There also has 
been widespread impact of destruction and violence on 
all Croatians although some have obviously been more 
directly affected than others. While Croattan 
ethnologists are engaged in case studies of the impact 
of the war on their territory. it is surely notable that 
Povrzonovet also states the need -for an ethnography 
of this war wrinen from the other side." and she also 
notes the existence of a peave movement in Serbia. 
One may hope that at some point conditions will permit 
these scholars to exchange ideas. 
None of the essays .... nnen by those fmm 
outside ex-YugllsJ:lvia deal wllh the ~pecifics of contllcl 
but rather wllh a socieTy 011 the eve 01 war. ThiS l~ a 
consequence of the almost ~wo years that have elapsed 
stllce this special is~ue ..... ,,~ toncelved. There is nllw 
the possibility that ..... ar may he reigntted in Crnatla. 
The truce hne~ are not recognized as stable or 
desirable boundaTies. Pressures for readjustment 01 
houndarles come especially from those displaced from 
their homes. There i~ concern that fighting may engulf 
other areas such as Kosovo and Macedonia. with large 
Albantan minorities, and VOJvodina with it~ Hungarian 
and other non-Serb populations. It is thus appropriate 
to see these accounts as a prelude 10 war. as not only 
anticipating Iragedy but also as the end of an era. 
One of the notahle katuTl;:s of the Yugoslav 
conflict is the unity of objectives of the warring 
panics. That is. they have all focused nn the 
destruction of the cultural heritage of tllelr enemies 
while cataloging and mourning tlleiT own losses. 
Particularly lacking has been a sense of a common 
heritage worth preserving. This purposeful destruction 
of past historical idenllties is paralleled by the partial 
obliterallon of tile infrastructure painstakingly built up 
since World War Two. tlte development of which was 
a crowning achievement of socialist Yugoslavia and a 
prime rationale for lIS existence. Such actions not only 
obliterate a part of the past. they preempt the future 
and thus doubly impoverish the present. It now seems 
pos~lble tltat If fighting continues the destruction may 
equal. or even exceed. that of the Second World War 
in Bo~nia and parts of Croatia . 
The Reality or tbe Conflict and the Objecth'es or 
this Issue 
In assun1lng rcspQnslblhty as guest ednor for thiS 
issue of The Anthropology 0/ East Europe H.eriell' I 
only hop<! that a part of my and the editOr's aspirations 
can be realized. As di~cussed. providing some 
Olympian perspecllve on this tragedy is not our aim. 
Rather. we hope to convey some understanding of the 
faclOrs behind the present state of affairs and, 
hopefully. to provide some insight into why the conflict 
may continue. Of course. such abstract statemt:nts do 
not do justice to the ternhly unequal realllles III the 
conflict. One cannot equ~te anarchy. repression. 
economic decline and the burden of refugees in Serbia 
with hunger. starv~tion. rape. torture. killing and the 
destruction of villages and towns. all in the name of 
ethnic cleansing in Croalla and Bosnia. In some ways 
this stnvlllg for ethnic homogeneity is an allempt to 
impose an image of rural uniformity against the real 
diversity of town and City. The student anll-war 
protests which Pro~i(:-Dvomi(: descnbes do not simply 
represent a sophisticated Belgrade element opposing 
Milosevic's fascist tinged populism. or the secular city 
against the populist small-town and CountrySide. 
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Enforced ethOic homogencll). a consequence 
of etl1l1ic clean~lIIg. repre .. cnts n.,t only an obvious 
delllal of democrat)' and of the mull1ethnic secular 
nalUre of contemporary urtun hfe. but also a negation 
of hlswry. Particularly In the Balkans. widespread 
Imgrallon has been a major part of the historical 
record Ethnic homogeneuy emphasizes an artificial 
~tabihty. based nn restritting conroct and population 
movement The predomlllant Image of this phenomenon 
is death. not only (0 one'~ foe~ hut for a multi-cullural 
~oclal system and an IIIterdependem world 
\Iigrations and Ethnic Cleansing 
In hi~ book: The Balkan Prmnsula the great 
<"crbian ~cholar 10lan C\'ijl~ suggested that a pan of 
<"crbcan idenw) \~as eSllhlishcd through a series of 
migrations A scholarl} serieS. !kttlemenls (md Ihe 
OrlgllZs of Popllla/IOII published b) thc Serbian 
Acadcm) of S(icnce~. follo\\ed (\lJIC'S ideas and I~as 
~a~i( to Serbian ethno!\)g) for ~me eight) )ears, 
rhe~e \olumes anal~/e ~} fCg.ion the migration histol) 
(If ",erblL There IS a I;ontradittion to ethni( deansing 
inherent III these a(count:. of migration. partlcularl!-
true for thost' sludie~ '~hich deal \\Ith Serbllln 
IIlIgmtlon oublde the boundancs of SerblL Implicit III 
thl~ serie~ is the Idea that no group can hale II 
monorol) on Ihe Tight to migrate or dalm Its 
hl,tom;al mOl cmenl as umque 
The disputcd ethnic frontiers \~ithin ex-Yugoslal'ia 
n:pre!>ent nOt "age old" ImmUUlble boundaries but 
rdatl\'eI) penneablc dlvidmg lines fixed at panicu!ar 
hlston(al penods. It i" elearl~ not the mixture of 
!'Copies as such \Ihich is the i5sue tout mther the 
constant!) \aJ} IIIg I aluc~ attached to the'ie 
distributions Ethnic homogcneit) i) not onl) 
profoundl) anti-urban. but It IS ahlstoncal as \I ell and 
ignorc~ the fact thal until Ilell IIIto the 19th centul). 
cnles like Belgrade had largel) non-indigenous 
populations in which Serbs were a minon!) until well 
mto Ihe 19th ccntur;.· [n Serbia it was Ihe countryside 
I~hich lIas homogeneous. though 1\ \\ould insult the 
peasants of Serbia lind their historit's to consider 
ethnic homogeneity a folk concept Peasants always 
e\ist togcther with urbanites and Serbian peasant \\ere 
acti\C traders. as were the founders of both 19th 
centur;. Serbian dynasties. Folk s)mbohsm has been 
use..! ad nauseam b~ the Milok\it gOlemment to 
facilitate its poI\er As ohsen-cri the conflict hale 
noted. it has not been engendered solely b) ethnic 
h(lIreds but by the manipulation of historic 
antagonisms h) fonner eommu01sts as II means of 
consolidating their power 
The V.!' has m efleet ~upponed the:.c 
attitudes The) hale failed to recognize the basic right 
of people 10 remalll In their homes and share a 
communal life. A mulll-<:ultural societ) has no place 
111 t T!'J partition plans for Bosnia ba-.ed on the 
legitimization of ethnic cleansing. A partition \\hich 
creates Inviable ministates invites fmure conflict. 
There IS also a temfying logic involved In the division 
of Bosnia If small ethnic enc1aH:S can be can-'ed out 
Illthln ,mOl-states, Ilh) should Croatia and Serbia be 
an~ different from BosOIa" Why not a Serbian 
enclale Illthln Croatia and Albanian and lIungarian 
ones Ilithm Serbia? 
Varying Assumptions and the Social Category 
"Yugoslal'" 
All the contributors to this Issue try to be 
anal) tical though basic perspecm·es differ. It is not 
the ~urpose of this introduction to establish a 
dominant or correct one but to show some of the ways 
these perspectivcs relate as well as to bring together 
here thc mnge of cultures which ehamcterized ex-
Yugoslavia. These essays were originally sohcited 
from anthropologists (and one social historian 
concerned \lIth peasant SOCiety. Despalatovic). 
Contnbutors Ilcre asked to provide background to the 
ongoing conflIct based on their pre-war fieldwori;:. 
These es~ys are mainly organized regionally by the 
fonner republics of Yugoslavia There arc, ho ..... ever. 
other essa)'s such as the demographiC analysis of 
Botel and Wagner concerned With intennaniage. 
I~hich appropriately take a Yugoslav focus. 
While some essays are concerned with the 
dynamics of the Serb-Croat conflict as a whole (e.g. 
Dcnich and Hammel). others take a panJcular regional 
perspective, Thus there is a Serbian viewpoint 
presented by Simie paralleling Despalatovie on 
Croalla. The essays are different In style With Simic, 
more programmatic and Despalatovic focusing on 
historic specificilles and personal observatIon. 
Regionally. from Croaua, arc: the wori;:s of Bennett 
and Olsen reporting on towns in Dalmatia and 
5[a\lollia respectively. Though some of the authors 
have tics to the region by parentage or marriage, they 
nonctheless are observcrs from the outside. Most of 
the authors arc: American and based In the U.S. The 
e)(ceptlons are Bringa, who is Norv.egian. and 
Minnich and Schwartz who write from Bergen and 
Copenhagen respectively. The other two authors, 
POI erzanovi<! and ProSit-Dvomi<! rcpresent -insider" 
\'Iews and deal with aspects of the impact of the WIlT 
on Zagreb and Belgrade respectively 
Some of these essays focus on issues of 
cultural legitlmaey. Reineck emphasizes this for the 
Albanians of Kosovo. who lire predominantly Moslem. 
Compared to Siovellia which is, as Mmnich shows. 
lingulstical1). geographically and culturnl1y apart from 
the rest of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians reside in 
what had been the heartland of the Serbian medie\a1 
kingdom. an area contaimng many re\lered Serbian 
O.,hooox churches. Therefore:. In the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. Yugosla\l ann) action in $lol'cnia was 
sporndlc and hmlted while Koso\lo is now ruled 
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directly from Belgrade with political and cultural autonomy for the majority Albanians out of the question.
Reineck describes this situation and its impact on Albanian society while the statistical comparisons of Botev
and Wagner show these two areas as economic and social opposites within former Yugoslavia. Compared to
Slovenes and Albanians, the Orthodox Macedonians described by Schwartz have a close relationship to the
Serbs both culturally and linguistically. But their distinctiveness, also reflected in their national traditions and
political activity, was recognized by the communist government which granted Macedonia republic status.
Still Macedonia is distinct in that, in addition to the majority Orthodox Macedonians, there are significant
minorities of Albanians and of Slavic speaking Moslems. (A portion of these latter people declared
themselves "Turks" and migrated to Turkey after World War Two.) Relations between the Macedonian
speaking Orthodox and Moslems as presented by Schwartz continue to be stable, though there has always
been a defined separateness parallel to that in Bosnia, as described by Bringa. The war thus certainly did
not arise from local-level antagonisms. Rather, the origins of the conflict in Bosnia lie in the Serbian desire,
as articulated by its political leaders, to remain in a common Serbian state and not a constituent people in a
separate multiethnic one. Olsen provides a view from a town in Croatian Slavonia bordering on Bosnia.
Here, differences with Moslems were discussed but, as in Bosnia and Macedonia, were not a cause for
violence. Since Olsen studied a town her impression seems to have been that ethnic differences were
muted in the urban setting. What then produced the bitter struggles?
A View to the Past--Recent and Distant:
It was in Sarajevo, Bosnia, then an annexed Austro-Hungarian province, that the Habsburg heir, Archduke
Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. The involvement of Serbian nationalists in this has been described at
length. But it is now worth recalling that the museum honoring the main assassin, Gavrilo Princip, was built
by the Communist regime near the bridge where the murder occurred in downtown Sarajevo. Ironically, this
area has been heavily damaged by Serbian guns. Violence in the assertion of national identity is celebrated
by many nations. For most West European and North American countries it is only part of an heroic past,
though in ex-Yugoslavia it is part of a present indissolubly linked to a past. For many this past provides a
moral but violent guide to a future envisaging the elimination of others. The consequences for the coming
century are dramatically different from those which applied in the past. Today's complex and
interdependent world is now hostage to such historically focused conflicts which increasingly make the
present and future hostage to the past.The world can never really be the same after the Nazi Holocaust.
But although ethnic cleansing has similarities to Nazi policies, the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia does not involve
vulnerable minorities like Jews and Gypsies, but is between major ethnic groups. Most Western observers
see both the Serb-Croat and Bosnian conflicts as internally produced. This is, of course, not the Serbian
government viewpoint where the collapse of Yugoslavia is interpreted as the result of outside influences
from Germany, the Vatican, and others. But these discussions almost never include a detailed examination
of the areas where the war takes place. However, these essays do just that. The perspective they stress is
the normative aspect of multiethnic life in ex-Yugoslavia. Thus the industrialization of Yugoslavia in the
postwar period was associated with large-scale migrations to cities and brought together the
country'sdiverse national groups in new ways. During this period of "socialist construction" the history of
earlier generations was not forgotten but suppressed. This attitude reflected not only official policy but had
much public support through the 1950s and 60s when the Yugoslav standard of living was rapidly rising. As
the essays emphasize, the present war did not erupt because of uncontained hatreds but due to forces
mobilized by former communist elite using nationalism as a rationale. It is no accident that Milosevic the
banker and Tudjman the general received their training in the communist state apparatus. In reflecting on
the current scene one is overwhelmed by a sense of tragedy not yet played out. Both Hayden in his
reflections and Hammel in his "Yugoslav Labyrinth" point out the complexity of this ethnic war. As Hammel
states: "...there are no clean hands in this conflict, there are no guys in white hats." Like several other
contributors he notes that in all his travels he "never ... encountered hatred of the virulence that is now
expressed." These observations make it all the more imperative to understand how the transition to full
scale war occurred.
Was the Multiethnic State Ever Accepted?
In the extensive literature on Yugoslavia there was much comment on regional politics and associated
development problems, but one looks in vain for commentary about thepossibility of a catastrophic war. If,
however, I retroactively examine my field experiences I do recall suggestive incidents. For example, in a
1990 visit to Sofia I spoke with a representative of a Bulgarian nationalist party who
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in .. cighcd against the Moslems. This was in the 
context of the recent large-scale departure of Moslems 
from Bulgaria to Turkey in the last years of the 
Zhivkov regime This departure was preceded b)' a 
long period of harassment where Moslems weI\': 
pressed to assume Bulgarian names and identities. A 
fe~1 Moslems were killed, but the numbers v.ere 
limIted and some have since returned from Turkey. 
This unpleasant situation is still a far cry from 130snia. 
I was especially Impressed thaI the compldints of this 
Bulgarian nationalist lacked the profound antipathy of 
conversations I heard later that summer in 
Yugoslavia. There had always been some questioning 
of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state, particularly by 
non-Serbs, in a wa) that nc\cr happened in Bulgaria. 
Analogous to the Bulgarian·s comments was 
a remark made in the early 1960s by a Zagreb 
professor whose work focussed on connicts in 
Yugoslav economic planning. lie evaluated his trips to 
Belgrade by noting there wcre only two goods things 
about that city: Turkish coffee and the fast train to 
Zagreb. Such altitudes, however, do not easily explain 
Ihe emergence of a bitter war. From this perspective 
Denich's percepti .. e essay on the symbolically 
unburied dead from World War Two arc morc 
IfIstructive. She implies that clues to the eonniet do 
not lie m obsenable behaviors, but in perceived pasts 
as manipulated by elites. 
A contrasting theme. but one dommant in thc 
1950s and 196Os, was the desire to build a new 
socicty apan from the hatreds of the war. As a 
Croatian student from Sarajevo commented during 
research in Bosnia in the 1960s "We are united by our 
common suffering." This was, of course, the official 
communist view which looked to the ideal Partisan 
model. But this ethos did not last. More 
representative of the 1970s and 80s was an engineer 
from Belgrade who recalled that as a child he and his 
family were often insulted vacationing in Dalmatia 
where their license plates identified them as ffT)m 
Belgrade. In recent years such incidents became 
increasingly common. 
Still. somc ties across ethnic boundaries 
endure and the current war offers many examples of 
surviving inter-c:thnic friendships. For example, a 
young Moslem woman from Sarajevo, now a student 
in Austria, recalled how she left Sarajevo at the 
beginning of the current fighting. Her best friend, a 
Serb, gave up her identity card so she could exit 
through the Serbian lines. Arriving in Belgrade she 
\\as put up for several days at the home of Serbian 
friends. In a srld illld ironic commentary. many 
Moslem BOl(nian r\."li!gees in Austria interviewed in 
spring ]C)()) commented on how, until the outbreak of 
hostitities, they hd.! good relations with Serbs in their 
communlt ie~. 
Unresoh'ed Connicts Leading to War 
Denich's essa~ prmides a pcrspc:eu .. e on the 
cause~ of the prc~enl conflict. She depicl!i 1977 as a 
watershed when trends toward modemizauon ~~ere 
mterrupted Preceding. this \~as the '7 1 Croaltan 
"maspok" movement \\ hich articul~ted "Catholici~m. 
the Latin alphabet, and Croatian nationhood" Thi~ 
movement, Denieh suggests. re .. jled the "nation-state" 
concept in opposition to the Yugos!a\ idea v.hieh v.as 
supposed to resohe "the lack of congruence bem een 
ethnicity and territory," According to Denieh this 
mo~ement was al the expense of the Serbian minority 
m Croatia who composed about 15% of the 
population. Tito's purge of the Croatian communist 
leadership was also paralkled, Denich suggests. b) the 
disciplining of the so-called "Iib<:ral" i.e. 
anti-nationalist Serbian communists 
As noted, the unresolved animosities dallng from 
the killings in World War Two are also a key factor in 
the genesis of the present conflict. For more than twO 
gener.ltions Tito's communist system tried 
unsuccessfully to suppress these memOfles, While the 
Communists touted "brotherhood and unity" of all 
Yugosla\ peoples, their propaganda emphasized the 
Partisan victory over all mternal groups and external 
enemies to legitimll.c their strite. Consequentl)'. the 
suffering of the defeated were suppressed and the onl) 
dead of1iciall) remembered ~~crc those on the Partisan 
side. Their opponents were demonized and caricatured. 
much as happens among the conflicting groups toda) 
As wartime memorics rcmained unresolved. 
meaningful readjustment of interethnic relationships 
W35 impossible, In Spring 1986 the Serbian Academ~ 
of Sciences held a confcrence about the World War 
Two casualties. Vladimir Dedier. Tito's biographer 
and later a dissident, was a major organizer. In 
retrospect it seems significant that he was originally 
from a Serbian family in Sarajevo. Also among the 
sponsors was the Serbian academician Milos Macuro. 
a demographer and fonner head of the Population 
Division of the Unitcd Nations, by origm from Knin. 
in Krnjina. Though the conference attracted 
considerable attention and opening sesSIons \\ere 
attended by a large number of scnior Yugoslav anny 
officers, no significant publication resulted Certainl) 
Ihis matter was never pursued on a multinational basis 
with Croats and others, Both ethnic-national factors 
and) ears of Communist "unity" propaganda 
undennined su~h an effort. Only I>artlsan names were 
on the omnipresent lucal war monumcnts as the 
Communists were obviousl) un\\ ming to confront the 
myths they had creatcd It i~ certainly sigmifieant 
that man) prominant mt:mhcro. of the Serbian 
Acadamy have supported the MiloSevec go\emment 
Even in 1990 the ~Ignificant differenccs in vie\\s 
between mcmhcrs of the academ) and many facult), III 
the uni .. ersity v.ere already. 
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The failure of communism to meaningfully 
resolvc ethnic differences is now related to the ways 
in which pre-socialist and SOCialist Yugoslavia were 
put together. A number of the contributions refer to 
the now apparent reluctance of the various peoples to 
enter into the Yugoslav stale as a resul t of the 
Versailles conference ending World War I. Thcy also 
refer to the failure of Wilson·s viSion of the 
emergencc of nation states from the remains of the 
multinational Austro-liungarian and Oaoman empires. 
Certainly thc opposed viewpoints of the Croats and 
Serbs about the cstablishmelll of Yugoslav statehood 
have long been cvident. The unfilled expectations of 
the former and the feelings of the latter on abandoning 
their own state have frequently been expressed. 
Related to this a Serbian view now sees as their loss 
thc autonomy provisions for Kosovo Albanians and for 
various other minorities. like Hungarians in the 
Vojvodina. They note that no analogous provision 
was made for Serbs in Croatia. 
Views from Croatian and Serbian Perspectives 
Some insight into the conceptual barriers that 
divide Serbs and Croats can be gained from the 
divergent perspectives presented by Despalatovic and 
Simic, both accomplished scholars with long 
expericnec in ex-Yugoslavia. Regarding postwar 
Yugoslavia Despalatovie writes: 
Although the new Yugoslavia was 
a federation of socialist national 
republics. to many Croats it seemed 
as if Serbia and the Serbs were still 
in control. Serbia was the largest 
national repUblic. Belgrade was still 
the capital of Yugoslavia, and Serbs 
played a dominant role in the 
Communist Party. the officer corps 
... (and) the police. Communism and 
Serbian control .... ere linked in the 
minds of many Croats. 
Simic agrees with this characterization C .. Serbs 
were represented in disproportionately large numbers 
in the Yugoslav police. bureaucracy and anned 
forces"): he nonetheless asserts that Croatian claims of 
"Serbian hegemony" were "hardly justified.H since. 
"The Tito government had effectively reduced the 
political power of the Serbs by the division of 
traditional Serbian lands between Serbia proper, 
Vojvodina. Kosovo and the newly-created republic of 
Macedonia. ~ There is no apparent way to reconcile 
these views. but Despahnovie does provide one slight 
possibility when she eondillons her remarks (as eited 
above) by stating. nin the minds of many Croats." 
[t is of course illusory to attribute the CU\Tent 
conflict primarily to maners of perception, but 
culturally-based perceptions of differences are 
important as they conditions the construction of 
different pasts. The StrbHm view of self as victim is 
constituted out of their shared memories and linked 
wilh their oral traditions. To them it IS not Incongruent 
th:ll .... hile Serb forces capture t~rritory In Bo~nia the) 
nonetheless perceive themselves as the vicllms in tho: 
war. lkspalatovic and Simic encap~ulate Croallan and 
Serbian perspectives on other rnallel"li as .... cll. 
Thus Despalatovic refers to the Ustashe as. 
Ha tiny. extreme nationalist polilleal pa~ \\hieh had 
spent most of the interwar period in e\.ile " She further 
notes that the Nazi-sponsored staLe they established 
was. "an imposed and unpopular regime. and rnan~ 
morc Croats joined the Partisans than supported the 
USlashe." In contrasL Simie details Ustashe atrocities 
and estimates that they killed about 800.000 people, 
mainly Serbs. but also Jews. Gypsies and Croatian 
opponents. Though Despalatovic observes that 
"Thousands of Serbs were killed by Ustashe. others 
died ;;; Ustashe run concentration camps," she mainly 
disagrees with Simie and states that "487.000 Serbs 
died in Yugoslavia from all causts during World War 
T ..... o. of these 126.000 died in Croatia." 
Simic provides a Serbian perspective about 
the sequencc of events \~hich led to the war in 
Croatia. specifically fOCUSSing on referendum of the 
Serbs in Croatia of May 14.1991 when they then 
voted to secede should the Croats opt for 
independcnce. "Five days later the Croats nOI only 
took this course but also refuscd to recognize the 
results of the Serbian rderendum." Of course. 
Despalatovic quest ions why a Serbian minority which 
"made up less than one-eighth of the population of 
Croatia in 1991 (should) be allowed to oecup~ 
one-third of Croatian tcrritOI)'. Why should the Croats 
in Serb-conquered regions be cxpelled from their 
homes and depri\ed of their property at gunpoint in 
the namc of ·cthnie elcansing?" Events move rapidly 
and since this conlTibution was wrillen both Serbian 
and Croatian forces have seized additional territories 
in Bosnia. Some of Dc:spalatovic's pertinent questions 
might now be applied to Croatian as well as Serbian 
forees in Bosnia as \\el1. 
Despal(ltovic suggesL~ other analytical 
approaches on the current conflict \\hen she refers to a 
Hstrange combination" of fonna communist leaders 
trying to hold onto power. a strong modem (lnn~ 
without a state and the distrust of rural people for 
urban eiviliLation (a poml discussed earlier) combined 
with old national myths and twenlleth e.::ntury racism. 
lIer comments tic In with a 1993 article in the Serbian 
independent magazine J"reme which rcf.::rred to the 
anti-urban bias of the Milokvic regime lind the rural 
strength of Serbian proto· fascists like V. 5eSelj lind his 
nationalist party. This is also a point made b~ 
Pro~ic-Dvomic in her analySiS of the student 
demonstrations in Belgrade. She says that the students 
were demonstrating in support of a ci\il society and 
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agamst the ~primordial~ nationalistic fear.; espoused b) 
Milo~e\if 
Like Despalato\ic. Simlc notcs that the leaders of 
the ne\\ politics in Serbia. Croatia. Slo\cnia. and 
Macedonia all ha\e communist party backgrounds. 
He points out thc increasingl) powerful role of 
rehgion and religious symbolism in thc successor 
stales of ex-Yugoslavia emerging from the collapse of 
secular communism. Religion IS a po .... erful 
supportmg pillllf for the ne .... nationalisms and is thus 
implicill~- a causal factor in the cu~nt conflict. For 
e'ample. Simic links the appearance of a sac;n:d \'ision 
al MedjugolJc m the Croallan region of lIerccgovina 
to the Franciscans. lie notes that this Catholic order 
was most closely tied to the Independent State of 
Croatia. and thus linkcd to Croatian nationalism. On 
the Orthodox side he refers to thc newly completed 
Orthodox cathedral In Belgradc, "now the largest in 
F.umpe." 
Man) also c;onsider premature Wc~lem retogniuon 
of both Croatia and Bosnia befon: the mterethnic 
conflic;ts in each country had a chance to be 
effecti\'el) resohed to hal e been a key factor in 
precipillltillg the conflict. ThaI is. the position of the 
Serbian population ill cach of these statcs was not 
effectivcl) considcred In retrospect, it is not quite 
clear how this mIght haw been accomplished in a 
way satisfactory to all parties concerned. However, it 
is significant that no creditable attempt was made. 
Abo contributing to the war was the inability or the 
ull\lillingness of the Yugoslav Nalional Anny to pia) 
a peace-makmg role in the mitial phases of the 
connlct and to control the aggression of various Serb 
and other irregular forees. The Yugoslal Anny .... as. 
howcl-er. in fact. if not fonnall). a Serbian arm) and 
so supportmg a Serbian cause .... as expectable 
behavior. 
In his contribution Ilayden raises the issue of 
Oriental ism. particularly as applied to the Serbs 
(although one could also say that the Serbs ha\'c lricd 
to Oricntalize the secular European- oriented Bosnian 
Moslems by calling them fundamentalist and picturing 
thcmseh'cs as the defendcrs of ChristiaIlllY). Ilaydcn 
bcgllls this discussion by quotmg a 1991 statement of 
a Siol cne MlIlistcr of SCIences to the effect that the 
"basic reason~ for the prescnt crisis is the 
IIlcompatibilit} of two mam frames of 
referencc i civi1i7.atlons. ~On one side. you have a 
typical Violent and crooked onental-byzantine (sic) 
hentage, best exemplified by Serbia and Montenegro. 
On the other side (SlOVenia. Croatia) there is a mOl\! 
humble and diligent western·Catholic tradillon" This 
minister sees Independent (and westernizcd) Slo\enra 
and Croatia aCllng as a ~con.lon sanitairc~ agamst Ihil> 
"eastern" chaos 
It ccrtainl} IS notable Ihal the peoples of the 
Balkan pcnphef) pIcture themsel\es as chosen 
defenders of the Western core. The mmister's 
observations. of course. also ignore the fact that the 
most inhuman savagery in World War T .... o originated 
in Gennany in the Western core region. Such ideas of 
Ralkan, Serbian Orientalism have been around a long 
time. fh e cmigre Croatian sociOlogist Dinko Tomasic 
published on this theme in the U.S. in the early 19505. 
Ilayden views such ideas as racist and sees them as 
Impl icitly proposing a new iron curtam to be based on 
religious aod cultural criteria. 
These manrfestalions of chauvinistic nationalism in 
the successor Slates of ex-Yugoslav ia are seen by 
Hayden to resemble moSt closely the Situation in 
C~ntral Euro~ in the 19305 or contemporary 
neo·fascist groups such as the National Front in 
Fraru::e. He also links such ideas to those of the 
American politician Patrick Buchanan who stresses that 
the United States is a country of Western European 
culture and that future immigration from outside of 
Westem Europe must be restricted . In the collapse of 
communism in Eastem Europe Hayden posits that this 
is not only associated with the rise of natiomlism but 
also with the decline of the idea of a class focused 
view of the nation. As espoused by Marx this idea was, 
of course, part of the core ideology of the ex-Yugoslav 
communist state. 
Also involved in the currenl rise of authoritarian 
nationalist governments is the demise of the Wilsonian 
perspective which sought to combine democracy with 
the creation of nations based on shared national 
Identities. Bnnga links Wilson to the Leninist v;cw of 
nauonal;ty but. of course, this does not take into 
account Wilson's democratic Idealism. Jan Urban, the 
Czech wnter and fonner Civic Forum chainnan , has 
expressed the view that. 
The fmal tragedy (of ex-Yugoslavia) 
IS that a Wilsonian vision of a new 
country that can rise aoove the 
lIIany differt:nces of it~ peoples. on 
the model of the United States. may 
JUSt be impossible in a Europe WIth 
less space and longer historical 
memories. (10 Mjchael D. 
Mosettig's review of. "Serbs and 
Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia. 
by Alex Dragnich, in Europe, p." 
47. Dec.-Jan .. 1992-93.) 
The struggle is emphatically. of course . not due to 
ethnIc hostilities alone but as Anthony Borden and 
Zoran PII.JIC write 10 The International Herald Tribune 
(1128/93, p. 8) In "Bosnia: 
The Vance-Owen Plan Won't 00" 
... the world must adopt a broader more 
long-term view of the Balkans. A new 
approach would mean comprehending 
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extreme ethnic politics not as an inevitable result of historic animosities and post-Communist transformation
but as deliberately manufactured politics by vicious populist leaders on all sides. 
